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Abstract: The notion that business corporations should be managed for the exclusive benefit 
of shareholders has been widely challenged. In particular, critics have argued that directors are 
authorised to serve the interests of the corporation: a legal entity that is completely separate 
from its shareholders. However, the premise that shareholders have sole legitimate claim to 
‘membership’ has rarely been questioned. This article explores medieval thought on ownership, 
authority and participation in guilds, churches, towns and universities, and shows that 
membership can be understood as participation in, and shared responsibility for, a group’s 
distinct collaborative activity over time. Our theory suggests that ‘membership’ in the modern 
corporation extends to non-shareholding stakeholders, but with the implication that ownership 
and authority are vested in the members as a body and not in a separate entity.         
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What makes a shareholder a ‘member’ of a corporation, and what are the responsibilities that 
membership entails? Should shareholders even be considered members at all? And if so, might 
other stakeholder groups (e.g. employees) also have a legitimate claim to membership? If 
managers receive their authority from the corporation’s members, then the answers to these 
questions shape the purposes that managers can legitimately pursue on the corporation’s behalf. 
The extent to which a corporation’s purpose can encompass the interests of non-shareholding 
stakeholders (e.g. employees) would seem to depend on whether such groups should be 
considered corporate members, and therefore on the criteria for attributing membership status. 
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 Theories of corporate purpose in the business ethics and corporate governance literatures 
frequently entail for the rejection of ‘shareholder primacy’ – the view that managers are 
accountable exclusively for the pursuit of shareholder interests, and (implicitly) that 
shareholders alone are ‘members’ (Friedman 1970, Jensen and Meckling 1976, Fama and 
Jensen 1983, Sternberg 2000, Sundaram and Inkpen 2004, Boatright 2006). It is typically 
argued that this view misunderstands the relationship between a corporation and its 
shareholders. For example, where Friedman (1970) claimed that “a corporate executive is an 
employee of the owners of the business” and that “the executive is an agent serving the interests 
of his principal [the stockholders]”, it is objected that corporate property is owned by the 
corporation itself rather than by shareholders, and that the latter cannot be a ‘principal’ 
authorising an ‘agent’. These criticisms have been developed extensively in both the business 
ethics (Boatright 1994, Phillips 2003, Kaler 2006, Sison and Fontrodona 2013) and progressive 
corporate law literatures (Ireland 1999, 2003; Blair and Stout 1999, Stout 2012, Robé 2011, 
Deakin 2012, Chassagnon and Hollandts 2014).       
 
We agree that shareholder primacy can be challenged along these lines. However, we argue 
that this focus on ownership is inadequate because it targets only the claims of  individual 
shareholders.1 Inspired by investigation of medieval sources and practices, we argue instead 
that a corporation can be identified with a body of individuals that its management is authorised 
to serve. A more persuasive challenge to shareholder primacy is therefore to ask whether the 
modern business corporation is constituted, at least in part, by non-shareholding members. For 
as Ciepley (2015: 8-9) observes, besides arguments from property ownership, a further ‘leg’ 
                                                          
1 Stout (2012: 37) remarks, for example: “Owning shares in Apple doesn’t entitle you to help yourself to the 
wares in the Apple store.” 
propping up the ‘stool’ of shareholder primacy is that shareholders alone are ‘members’, “and 
since it is their club, it should be run in their interest.”  
 
For example, the UK Companies Act 2006 states that a director’s duty is to “promote the 
success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole…” (s 172(1)). In a company 
with share capital the ‘members’ are the shareholders (s 8(1b)) and the corporation is identified 
with the members (s 16(2)). And Delaware corporation law appears to view ‘member’ and 
‘stockholder’ as equivalent terms.2 On this reasoning, a corporation is identified with a body 
of members which authorises a board of directors to serve its interests: the corporation’s 
purpose therefore stems from the interests of its membership. One might expect to find a 
rationale for distinguishing members from non-members both in arguments for shareholder 
primacy and for more participative (stakeholder oriented) corporate governance. However, on 
either side of this debate, the issue has received little attention.  
 
Arguments concerning corporate membership did emerge, however, in the context of a range 
of medieval corporations: universities, craft and merchant guilds, villages and towns, collegiate 
churches and the Roman Catholic Church. Despite obvious differences between any of these 
corporate entities and the modern business corporation (Scruton 1989: 241-243), we find that 
concepts relevant to the question of corporate purpose today can also be found in medieval 
thought. The relationship between a corporation and its members was explored and contested 
between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries; in the process, connections were made between 
concepts that are central to the contemporary debate.  
 
                                                          
2 I.e., for a nonstock corporation, the term ‘member’ is used in place of ‘stockholder’ (General Corporation Law 
– Delaware Code, § 109(a)).   
Critics of shareholder primacy typically appeal to the separateness of the corporation from its 
individual participants – a view that follows logically from assumptions about the meaning of 
ownership and the source of managerial authority. In the medieval sources, we find an 
alternative possibility for how these concepts fit together, which in turn provides a clearer 
understanding of how members stand in relation to the corporation. These sources enable us to 
argue that authority and ownership reside in the members as a ‘plurality in succession’, in 
which individuals participate through their contribution to a distinct collaborative activity (or 
‘common good’). By rethinking the relationship between a corporation and the individuals it 
comprises, which is our primary aim, we develop a framework in which the normative question 
of non-shareholding membership can be addressed. 
 
Our task in this article is conceptual: we do not undertake a comparative evaluation of medieval 
and modern corporations, nor do we argue that values and practices specific to the medieval 
period should necessarily be adopted in modern business. Our concern is to find an alternative 
framing of the concepts that bear on the relationship between a corporation and its members. 
Although our framing of these concepts differs from recent debate on corporate purpose, it is 
in fact reinforced by recent work on the common good of the firm (Sison and Fontrodona, 
2012, 2013) and on the firm as a real entity (Vanberg 1992, Gindis 2009, Adelstein 2010), as 
we explore in the final section. 
 
II. THE CRITIQUE OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY 
In criticisms of shareholder primacy, it is emphasised that the corporation is ‘completely 
separate’ from its shareholders. Phillips (2003: 19) suggests that shareholder ‘ownership’ be 
tested “through a thought experiment: Who would own the corporation if it bought back its 
own stock?” He argues: “The corporation is not coextensive with the shareholders… The 
corporation is meaningfully distinct” (2003: 19-20). Ireland (1999: 41) traces the history of this 
separation, and observes that from 1860 in the UK shares were “forms of property independent 
of the assets of the company.” He argues that a “vital legal space thus emerged between 
companies – owners of assets – and shareholders – owners of shares” (ibid.), and that with the 
1862 Companies Act, “people no longer ‘formed themselves’ into incorporated companies, 
they ‘formed’ companies… made by them but not of them” (1999: 42). 
 
In the context of contemporary corporate law, Robé (2011: 24) argues that without a clear 
separation between assets and shares, “the worlds of structured finance, private equity, 
leveraged buy-out, securitization, etc. would not exist… If the shareholders were owners of 
anything else other than shares, the whole edifice would crumble.” Similarly, Deakin (2012: 
356) holds that the assets of the firm “vest in the separate legal person of the ‘corporation’”. 
And in her popular attack on the ‘shareholder value myth’, Stout (2012: 37) imagines: 
“Nonlawyers may find it hard to wrap their heads around the notion that an intangible and 
abstract institution like a corporation is a ‘juridical person’”. Nonetheless: “Corporations are 
independent legal entities that own themselves, just as human beings own themselves” (ibid.).3   
 
For these critics, the corporation’s autonomy as a separate entity means that shareholders 
cannot be ‘principals’ who authorise managers to act on their behalf. In law, the responsibilities 
of managers are to the corporation itself: “managers can’t be the agents of individuals who do 
not own the assets they are operating – who therefore cannot be principals in connection with 
these assets” (Robé, 2011: 32). Deakin contends that it was a ‘fiction’ of the founders of agency 
                                                          
3 Critics of shareholder primacy typically assume that shareholder ‘ownership’ implies a right to dispose of 
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Hansmann, that ownership is “control over an assemblage of contractual rights, none of which need involve 
physical assets…” (ibid: 299).  
theory to view shareholders as principals: “company law views directors as the agents of the 
company, and not of the shareholders” (2012: 360). The logic of the argument against 
shareholder ownership applies also to the ‘members’, whether or not they include other 
stakeholders: there are no ‘owners’ of a corporation, and therefore none who can authorise 
management to act in their name. The corporation and its members (if it has any) are, as legal 
concepts, altogether distinct.  
 
On this view, managers receive their authority directly from the corporation itself. The role of 
the members as an authorising body would therefore be misconceived, and it would be 
superfluous to argue against the assumption that shareholders alone are members. There are a 
few exceptions: Ireland (1999: 47) notes that “the basis for the privileged status of the 
shareholder as a ‘member’ is, indeed, ‘obscure’”, because in economic reality there is little 
difference between shareholders and debenture holders. He draws upon Goyder (1961) to 
suggest the extension of membership to employees, consumers and the community (2003: 505). 
Similarly, for theorists of the ‘common good of the firm’ (Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013), 
a corporate ‘member’ is one who participates in “collaborative work through which goods and 
services are produced” (2013: 612).  
 
By contrast, Ciepley (2017) argues that business corporations have no members, because they 
lack the essential features of true ‘member corporations’ (e.g., medieval universities, towns 
and guilds). For Ciepley, the source of a business corporation’s authority cannot be a body of 
members; instead, corporations are “‘franchise governments’ – their form and powers are 
delegated by the state, yet they are run on private initiative” (2013: 140). We respond to his 
arguments in section 3.4 and then, in section 4, we defend a theory of membership that is 
applicable to the business corporation of today.  
 At this stage, an objection might be raised. Not only did medieval corporations diverge in the 
purposes for which they were constituted – individual guilds, churches, towns and universities 
had distinct objectives, of course – but there are manifest differences between any corporate 
entity of this period and a modern business corporation. Scruton (1989), for example, writes of 
the modern firm as a “partnership for gain” and “a means to an end… dissoluble at will” (241-
242). By contrast, other types of corporate association (including the Roman Catholic Church) 
are characterised by internal purposes: i.e., “you do not join a church for the sake of a salvation 
that could be achieved in some other way” (ibid: 244).4  
 
And yet we can speak of all these associations as corporations because of their capacity to 
attract legal relations (Gindis 2016) in their own name. We can ask, of any corporation so 
defined, whose interests its managers are authorised to serve. If corporate ownership and 
authority reside in a body of members, then that is where one might find the answer. Critics of 
shareholder primacy have, of course, denied that shareholders have this status and insisted that 
ownership lies elsewhere. Yet this very objection illustrates that the relationship between a 
corporation and its members is central to the question of corporate purpose. The importance of 
the medieval arguments, in the present context, is that they offer a different perspective on 
precisely this relationship.  
 
III. MEDIEVAL CORPORATION THEORY 
There are two main influences on the development of the medieval understanding of 
corporations. The major theological source is the Vulgate Bible (Corinthians 1 12:12-27), 
which invoked the body (corpus) and members (membra) of Christ as a metaphor for the 
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‘mystical body’ of the Church. Saint Paul states: “For as the body is one and hath many 
members, and all the members of the body, whereas they are many, yet are one body, so also 
is Christ” (ibid: 12:12) and “…you [plural] are the body of Christ…” (ibid: 12:27). While this 
metaphor informed the ecclesiology of the Church as a corporate entity, it is difficult to find a 
philosophical source that influenced the medieval conception of corporations generally.  
Aristotle had said helpfully in the Politics (I.I. 1252a18) that the ‘compound’ of a city should 
be analysed prior to its elements, but his text was not translated into Latin until 1260 (Black 
1992: 2-3), by which time corporation theory had developed primarily on the basis of legal 
sources. The canonists (i.e., experts on Church law), for example, were much less interested in 
the metaphysics of corporations than in their constitutional structure: “the actual distribution 
of authority between head and members” (Tierney 1955: 102). The most significant impetus 
for the analysis of such problems was the rediscovery of Roman law in the late eleventh (or 
early twelfth) century, particularly the Digest of Justinian of AD 533.   
 
The Digest provided medieval lawyers with the concept of the universitas – from unum ‘one’ 
and vertere ‘to turn’ (literally ‘a number of individuals turned into one’, Brett, 2005: l) – which 
we now translate as ‘corporation’ (Ryan 2011: 236). According to the Digest (3.4), 
corporations would be allowed to form “only in very few kinds of cases”, but exceptions 
included miners of gold, silver and salt, and guilds of bakers and shipowners, who were 
permitted to have a corpus; i.e., a separate body in law with its own assets and liabilities (Digest 
3.4.7; see also Ryan 2011: 236). Although the Roman term universitas originally meant a 
‘lesser association’, it “had by the high Middle Ages become a general term” for states, cities, 
monasteries, guilds and other groups (Black 1992: 14). 
 
Given the breadth of the era we draw upon (approximately the twelfth century to the fifteenth), 
we use current scholarship to identify recurrent themes in the thought of the period. Although 
there were many legal systems operating in medieval Europe, there were common ‘languages’ 
(Pocock 2009) in which the features of the corporate form were elucidated.  Roman law is the 
common juridical language for legal analyses of the corporation – even where its concepts were 
mediated through canon or common law. And the Vulgate Bible provided a theological 
language in which the relation between parts and wholes could be expressed through the 
metaphor of bodies (corpora) and their members. These juridical and theological languages 
could also interact: for example, in the idea of the corporation as a persona mystica, as we shall 
see in the following section.  
 
3.1 The corporation as a legal person 
Medieval corporations were legal ‘persons’ that could own assets, incur debt and enter 
contracts independent of their individual members. As the Digest (3.4.7) puts it: “What is owed 
to the corporation is not owed to the individual members, and what the corporation owes the 
individual members do not owe…” In line with a standard criticism of shareholder primacy 
today, membership in a medieval corporation could not have been derived from individual 
ownership of corporate assets. However, to understand how medieval thinkers did understand 
membership, we first have to see how they explained the corporation’s legal status. 
    
With regard to the medieval Church, the corpus mysticum or ‘mystical body’ of Christ was 
more than a name for the ‘totality of Christian society’: it acquired ‘legal connotations’ and 
became identified as a ‘juristic person’ (Kantorowicz 1957: 209). Where Aquinas had stated 
that “the head and members are as one mystic person” (1981 III: 48.2), his choice of the word 
‘person’ (persona) lent theological weight to the prevailing juristic view, following Innocent 
IV’s decretal of 1246, that all corporations were personae fictae (‘fictive persons’) 
(Kantorowicz,1957: 202). ‘Fictive’ status in law meant that the medieval universitas, like the 
modern corporation, had legal capacity distinct from its transient ‘members’. The medieval 
corporation therefore “remained the same legal entity even though the persons of the members 
changed” (Tierney 1982: 19).    
 
This terminology applied not only to the Church but “to every size and rank of universitas” 
(Kantorowicz 1957: 209-210). The German craft guild, for example, “could will and act as an 
entity… It could enter into contracts and arrangements of all kinds” (Gierke 1990: 52). The 
assets of the guild “belonged to the fellowship as such… individuals held no private rights but 
were only authorised to use and profit from such assets as gild members” (1990: 56). The guild 
was therefore distinct from the medieval societas (or ‘partnership’) whose assets remained the 
property of its members (Aquinas 2002: 228). Medieval towns were also regarded as “having 
a moral right… to juridical personality, to the ownership of collective property” (Black 2003: 
45), though it was not always to the town’s advantage. In thirteenth century Tuscany, a court 
was persuaded “to put an entire subject town under ban and to compensate the plaintiff from 
that community’s common property, even though the town was now divided between 
factions...” (Ryan 2011: 236). The town, as a universitas, remained liable (ibid.). Legal capacity 
was also attributed to the city state or kingdom: fourteenth century cities of northern Italy, for 
example, had “legal existence and capacity distinct from those of their members” (Canning 
1988: 474).   
               
This was the legal orthodoxy, and medieval writers were not especially interested in developing 
a philosophical account of the corporate form. The canonists were more concerned with “the 
flood of litigation… concerning the authority of ecclesiastical corporations and the rights of 
their various members” (Tierney 1955: 104). However, in addressing the distribution of 
authority (ibid: 102), the simple fact of the corporation’s legal status did not offer a solution. 
Similarly, the fact that individual shareholders do not own corporate assets does not suggest on 
whose authority, or on behalf of which stakeholders, a modern corporation should be run. 
Notwithstanding the corporation’s separate legal status, medieval writers approached the 
problem by asking where corporate ownership (dominium) ultimately resides. By explaining 
their notion of collective ownership, we can now show that the question of whether a modern 
corporation should be run in the interests of non-shareholding stakeholders depends on whether 
the latter are parts of a greater corporate whole (the universitas), and not merely on the specific 
investments they may happen to make in a corporation (e.g., as creditors or employees).          
 
3.2 Collective ownership 
In the case of collegiate churches, it was recognised that property ownership resided, not with 
the bishop, but with ‘the church itself’ – “understood either as the clergy of the diocese or even 
the congregation of believers” (Ryan 2011: 237, Tierney 1955: 137). In his attempt to refute 
Pope Boniface VIII’s claim to temporal power, John of Paris argued that ecclesiastical property 
“has been given to communities, not to individual persons… it is the community which has the 
right of lordship over its property” (c.1302/1971: 96).  Furthermore, “the founders of churches 
intended to transfer lordship and proprietary right of the properties they were giving principally 
and directly to the community of the individual church” (ibid: 99). However, ‘collective 
ownership’ of corporate assets presents us with a paradox: ownership resides in a body of 
individuals, while the corporation itself owns the assets as a separate person in law.   
   
A solution can be found in the emergence of a theory that explained the relationship between 
a corporation and its members. Commentators on Roman law, such as Baldus, saw the city as 
“an abstract unitary entity perceptible only by the intellect” (Canning 1988: 473). It was 
constituted by its physical members and able to act only through them, but it was also a 
universitas and hence ‘immortal’ and “quite distinct from its human components” (ibid: 474).  
Innocent IV’s definition of the universitas as a ‘fictitious person’ made it possible to treat “a 
plurality of individuals juristically as one person” while distinguishing that person “from every 
natural person endowed with body and soul” (Kantorowicz 1957: 306). For example, Aquinas 
wrote that the state is both “composed of many persons” and established “to endure for all time 
as the citizens succeed one another” (2002: 138).5    
 
The explanation for this ‘essential feature’ of all corporations “is not that they are ‘a plurality 
of persons collected in one body’ at the present moment, but that they are that ‘plurality’ in 
succession” (Kantorowicz 1957: 310).6 By illustration, the “individual and material community 
of Bologna composed of mutable citizens and perishable buildings” was distinct from the 
‘personified community’ of Bologna, “an entity which was both immaterial and invariable” 
(ibid: 303). When medieval thinkers held that ‘ownership’ resided in a plurality, they conceived 
of the members collectively in succession – as an entity abstracted from, and surviving, each 
individual member. From this perspective, the corporation is identical to its members 
considered as one through time, which is exactly what the etymology of universitas (‘to turn 
into one’) implies.   
 
By comparison, it is assumed in the contemporary debate that ‘shareholder primacy’ is 
undermined when shareholder ‘ownership’ is refuted. Whether or not this is an effective 
                                                          
5 Aquinas follows Augustine, who wrote in City of God of the ‘eternity’ of a city maintained as “individual 
members die and are replaced by new births”, just as perennial trees are “maintained by the fall and renewal of 
the leaves” (1972: 1032).  
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membership on the souls of the dead (for example, on its members’ deceased relatives) (Westlake 1919: 115).  
criticism of Friedman (1970), conceptually it works only for the property of individual 
shareholders. For medieval writers, the members owned corporate property by forming a 
distinct, collective entity: the universitas itself. A solution can therefore be found to the 
contradiction apparent in the owning of assets by a corporation that are also owned by its 
members.   
 
In the modern debate, the membership status of a given stakeholder would therefore refer to 
their membership in a collective entity identified as the corporation. However, this would be 
relevant to the question of corporate purpose only if the corporation’s managers have a duty to 
serve the members’ interests. In the medieval arguments, neither the corporation’s legal status, 
nor the idea of collective ownership, unambiguously clarified why this should be so. For 
example, while ownership of church property “rested in some sense with the local community” 
(Tierney 1955: 140), Innocent IV placed it in the aggregate of all Christians. This implied, 
conveniently for the Pope, that all Church property was at his disposal, for Innocent also held 
that “all the jurisdiction of a corporation [is] concentrated in its head” (ibid: 141).  
 
What mattered was the source of authority for a corporation’s actions. If the right to govern 
the corporation’s affairs and adjudicate the implementation of its rules was bestowed by the 
members, then the corporation’s governing body was believed to be accountable for acting in 
the members’ interests. Depending on the context, the members might then claim a right to 
participate in the governance of the corporation. But this was not to be taken for granted: the 
source of corporate authority was a fiercely contested issue, particularly in the Church, from 
the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. We now review the competing perspectives that 
emerged in this controversy, and find they provide further reason to rethink the modern debate.    
       
3.3 The source(s) of corporate authority 
3.3.1 Authority in the Church 
For medieval writers, the problem was to establish whether authority is granted from ‘below’ 
by the members or from ‘above’ by a superior. Cardinal Hostiensis (a pupil of Innocent IV) 
argued that the bishop acquires jurisdiction from his election by the members of his 
corporation, i.e., from his cathedral chapter (Ryan 2011: 237). Hostiensis’s position 
corresponded with Accursius’s (d.1263) standard gloss to the Roman law: a judge receives his 
jurisdiction from the corporation that elects him, though the approval of a ‘superior officer’ is 
also required (ibid: 236). Hostiensis thus strengthened the view that had emerged through the 
first half of the thirteenth century, and afterwards was seldom challenged, that “authority in a 
corporation was not concentrated in the head alone but resided in all the members” (Tierney 
1955: 117).  
 
In 1313, the canons of Lincoln drew upon Hostiensis to declare that the chapter is the ‘source’ 
(fons) of the bishop’s authority (Tierney 1955: 127), which would make the bishop subservient 
to his chapter. This move was deemed unacceptable by the Church – authority could be 
transferred to the bishop through election of the chapter, without that authority having 
originated in the members (ibid.). But how can members bestow authority which originates 
from another source? In Roman law, corporate authority resides with the members and is 
delegated to a spokesperson. In the case of the Roman private corporation, the members could 
modify or revoke the agent’s powers (Tierney 1982: 26-27). However, in canon law, the 
cathedral chapter could elect the bishop but “did not simply delegate its own authority… the 
bishop entered upon an office with its own inherent dignity, rights and powers”, derived from 
“the ancient constitution of the church” and ultimately from God (ibid.). On the other hand, the 
canons – who held land independent of the bishop – could elect an ‘agent’ where their interests 
were at stake (1982: 27). For practical purposes, this meant “authority was shared between 
bishop and chapter… A major act involving the welfare of the whole church required the assent 
of both parties” (ibid.).  The bishop could not, for example, alienate church property without 
the chapter’s agreement (Tierney 1955: 120-124).  
      
3.3.2 Authority in guilds 
Authority in the guild was less fiercely contested than in the Church, but even here the source 
of authority is ambiguous. Gierke is clear that medieval fellowships (including craft guilds) 
were founded on the “free will of the members” (1990: 19), even though the exercise of trade 
rights required “the authorisation of the [town] council… or civic overlord” (1990: 50). Black 
(2003: 18) adds that guilds “needed recognition as ‘colleges’ or corporate legal bodies… in 
order to establish their position as traders’ or producers’ monopolies”.7 By agreement with the 
town authorities, the “guild was allotted a prescribed role in the city’s economic life, often 
designated specifically as a duty or office (officium)” (ibid.).         
      
Did the medieval guild therefore owe its existence, and powers of self-government, to the will 
of the town? A parallel suggestion is found in ‘concession’ or ‘state grant’ theories of the 
modern business corporation (e.g., Ciepley 2013). Medieval jurists took a similar view of 
guilds, but they did not generally believe them to be created by town governments. Although 
the trade rights enjoyed by each guild were granted by the town, the Roman law itself (not a 
town council) was thought to authorise the guild’s corporate existence. The jurists argued that 
the list of guilds (collegia) explicitly permitted by the Digest (3.4) – e.g., bakers, shipowners 
and salt miners – was merely indicative, not exclusive (Black 2003: 19). They held that craft 
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the technical sense employed by modern economists. Judicial authorities in medieval England “vigorously 
enforced laws… which were the legal ancestors of the anti-trust legislation that exists today” (2001: 237).   
guilds generally were legalised by the Digest without the need for further approval (ibid.). For 
example, the guilds of Magdeburg were granted to exist according to ‘liberty’ and their 
‘integral right’ (ibid: 18). Even Innocent IV held that craft guilds (unlike cities and churches) 
required no special privilege from a superior (ibid: 20) – Roman law was said to bestow direct 
legitimacy on a guild’s corporate existence (ibid.).8   
 
3.3.3. Authority in universities 
Besides Roman law, a corporation might be authorised by custom or common law (Post 1934: 
423). The universities of Bologna, Paris, Padua and Oxford effectively enjoyed corporate status 
decades before specific charters of foundation were granted. Jurists of the fourteenth century 
classified them as ‘customary studia’, even after the charters had been received (Leff 1968: 
19). However, in a parallel case to that of guilds and towns, the earliest universities had to look 
to a ‘higher’ authority to protect their privileges (Leff 1968: 24), and might appeal to one 
authority for protection against another.9 For example, while the chancellor of the University 
of Paris claimed the right to “fine, excommunicate and jail” students and teachers, “in the 
conflict that naturally developed, the teachers’ staunchest allies were popes Innocent III, 
Honorius III, and Gregory IX” (Bernstein 1978: 291).  
 
It follows that medieval university, church and guild corporations could not look solely to their 
members for the source of their corporate privileges. Roman law, common law or ‘custom’, a 
pope, town council or king could legitimise a corporation’s legal status, depending on the 
                                                          
8 Innocent went further by advancing the ‘radical view’ that craftsmen could form corporations on “their own 
authority if they wish” (cited in Black 2003: 21), which would make the ‘will’ of a group the source of its own 
authority (ibid: 22).  
9 This scenario was not unique to universities. In 1415, the parish guild of St George of Norwich sought a 
charter from Henry V because it was “in conflict with the city authorities” (Westlake 1919: 116).    
circumstances.10 Corporations were also dependent on external authority for the exercise of 
some of their rights: for example, the right to elect a superior over themselves. However, rather 
than excluding the members as a source of authority, this dependence upon superiors was 
justifiable because lesser corporations and their members were constituent parts of larger 
corporations. The election of a bishop by his chapter had to be ratified externally because it 
affected the welfare of the Church as a whole. Likewise, a guild was not only a body in its own 
right, but also part of the town, representing the broader interests of the citizenry (Gierke 1990: 
49). It was therefore an intrinsic component of a common body that extended beyond its own 
immediate interests.11 In the case of the University of Paris, only rarely did the interventions 
of king and pope come into conflict, because whereas “the pope sought to oversee the university 
from the point of view of the ecclesiastical hierarchy… the king regulated its place within the 
city and, on occasion, the kingdom” (Leff 1968: 28-29) These sources of authority arguably 
reflect the different spheres of human well-being, beyond the good of its own members, to 
which the University contributed.  
 
3.3.4 Reconsidering the critique of shareholder primacy 
The conceptual frameworks we have explored complicate the arguments around shareholder 
primacy. Medieval and modern corporations share the generic feature of legal personhood 
distinct from their individual members – the very feature invariably emphasised today as a 
rebuttal to Friedman (1970). However, it was not considered by medieval writers to imply a 
conceptual separation of corporation and members. Instead, the corporation was conceived as 
                                                          
10 The University of Paris had relied upon papal support for its corporate independence but, as circumstances 
shifted in the rivalry between Boniface VIII and Philip the Fair, the University “had to choose for the first time 
between king and pope” (Leff 1968: 76). 
11 Westlake (1919: 107) explains how religious guilds in 15th century England “developed into the controlling 
factor in municipal business” with responsibility for maintenance of grammar schools and almshouses, for 
example. 
a legal person, owning assets which are the collective property of its members. The ‘owner’ or 
dominus, the corporation itself, can be identified with the members as a universitas.  
 
Furthermore, in the modern context, it is assumed that if shareholders own the assets then they 
must authorise management (the ‘agent’) to act exclusively in their interests, with the 
consequence that critics have made this premise their principal target. The medieval debate 
suggests this assumption is unnecessary. While corporate authority can reside in part with the 
members collectively, giving them certain rights, it can also originate in a source outside the 
corporation. For example, Ullmann (1961: 219) notes that no town “was ‘free’ in the sense of 
being an independent and autonomous entity”. Paradoxically, however, towns became self-
governing entities as a consequence of the royal charter which legalised their self-government. 
Similarly, merchant guilds acquired “self governance, legal rights, and predictable taxes – by 
purchasing from the king privileges enshrined in written charters” (Richardson 2004: 19). 
Authority did not flow only in one direction. Members could be ‘collective owners’ of 
corporate assets without unlimited authority to decide the corporation’s interests. While 
decisions of the whole corporation should represent the common interests of its members, they 
were circumscribed by a broader common good, represented by a ‘higher’ authority, of which 
the corporation itself was a part.   
 
We have thus far examined medieval thought on the corporation’s legal status, ownership and 
authority, and have drawn on these insights to elucidate the conceptual relationship between a 
corporation and its members. However, none of the conceptions we have reviewed provides an 
answer to the ethical question of who should count as a member. Nor do they suggest, in the 
modern context, whether shareholders have an exclusive claim to membership status or even 
are members at all.  We now look at the concept of the corporation’s common good and what 
it implies for the responsibilities of members. We argue that it is with reference to this common 
good that a member can be identified.      
 
3.4 Participation in the corporate common good 
That a legitimate corporation existed to pursue a common good for its members was held to be 
true almost by definition. In the words of Innocent IV, Roman law legitimised craft guilds 
because craftsmen came together to pursue a ‘praiseworthy profession’ (Black 2003: 21). In 
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, that craftsmen ‘come together’ or ‘have much to do 
together’ for a ‘just cause’ recurs in arguments for the legitimacy of craft guilds (ibid.). 
Richardson (2005: 152) finds that the goals of the guild reflected the ‘common interests’ of its 
members: e.g., higher prices, reputations for quality, stable wages and religious redemption. 
The practice of a craft was also a public office: the common good of the craft guild, at least in 
part, was to fulfil a duty to the community of the town (Gierke 1990: 25; Black 2003: 14; 
Richardson 2004: 17).  
 
These obligations implied that an individual’s right to enjoy the benefits of membership 
entailed a duty to shoulder the requisite burdens (Gierke 1990: 33; Richardson 2005: 150-153). 
However, rights and duties did not apply equally to all members. Medieval corporations, like 
their modern counterparts, allowed for degrees of status within an organisational hierarchy.12 
An undisputed fact of medieval towns was a division between ‘full’ and ‘passive’ members: 
“monasteries, religious orders, Jewish communities, visitors, citizens of other towns, 
                                                          
12 Notwithstanding differences of status between the members, the perpetual life of the corporation itself was 
independent of the personal status of its members. North, Wallis and Weingast (2009: 26-27) suggest that 
‘perpetually lived organisations’ (corporations) created the possibility of ‘impersonal rights’ that extended 
beyond the personal privileges of elites. Following Kantorowicz, they connect the recognition of corporate 
rights with the emergence of the modern state as a perpetual organisation, in which sovereign “powers and 
privileges… must be defined impersonally” (ibid: 166); that is, as the rights of office rather than personal 
privilege.             
journeymen, servants, dependants etc., always formed a circle of denizens who did not take an 
active part in the government of the town” (Gierke 1990: 40).  The entire population of the 
town (including women, children and visitors) had a passive share in the protection offered by 
the town (ibid: 36), but those entitled to participate directly in the town's government were a 
more limited circle of ‘full citizens’. ‘Full’ membership entailed active participation in 
governing for the common good.   
 
Crucially, a right to enjoy the prosperity and protection of the corporation implied a 
commensurate duty to serve its common good (ibid: 44). Cities held to “the principle that a 
share in the city’s rights must always correspond to a share in civic burdens” (ibid: 45).13 For 
example, from their service to the town, artisans of the craft guilds deduced the right to 
question: “…what should be meant by ‘the profit, honour and gain of the town’, and the right 
to work… for the common good – that is to govern” (ibid: 42). However, the vast majority of 
citizens had only a passive, not an active, share in the rights of the town, either because they 
lacked full legal personality (e.g., women, minors, apprentices and servants) or because their 
legal rights extended beyond the town’s jurisdiction (e.g., members of chivalric or monastic 
orders) (ibid: 44-45). Nonetheless, these groups enjoyed the protection of the town and 
‘participation in civic burdens’ was expected of them. Jewish communities, for example, were 
taxed in proportion to the level of protection afforded to them (ibid: 45). 
 
Of course, an application of these principles to the modern corporation would be misplaced if 
the latter had no members. Ciepley (2017) argues that medieval universities, towns and guilds 
were archetypical ‘member corporations’ (universitates personarum): their members had one 
                                                          
13 Besides taxation, a citizen had an “an obligation to accept office”, to carry out guard-duty, and to take up 
arms when required (Gierke 1990: 44).   
vote each through which they controlled the admission of new members and elected their own 
governments. He contends that the modern business corporation, as presently constituted, has 
none of these characteristics. From this it follows that neither shareholders, nor any other 
stakeholder group, have whatever moral status is attached to membership. However, Ciepley’s 
characterisation of medieval ‘member corporations’ implies formal equality of members in 
decision-making (i.e., one member, one vote). On the other hand, our sources indicate varying 
degrees of status among the members – for example, between master craftsmen and apprentices 
of a guild,14 or between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ citizens of a town. Medieval ‘member 
corporations’ cannot, therefore, be defined by strict equality.  
 
What can be said generally of the medieval corporation is that its members participated in the 
collective pursuit of its common purpose. Although members may have viewed membership 
as a means to advance individual interests,15 what defined their membership of a given 
corporation was their commitment to the collaborative activity undertaken by the group.16 This 
activity can be described as the corporation’s ‘common good’ – that is, an abstract purpose that 
would persist through changes of membership.     
 
While this understanding of membership avoids the lacunae we identified both in shareholder 
theory (Friedman, 1970) and in its critiques, it leaves unexamined the key principle of the 
‘common good’ – that which the members participate in. A corporation’s continuous pursuit 
of a common purpose cannot simply refer to the aggregate of its members’ separate interests 
                                                          
14 See Richardson (2005: 144) for a clarification of these roles.  
15 Richardson (2005: 153-155) gives examples of ‘typical situations’ in which the interests of guild members 
would diverge from organisational goals.    
16 Participation, however, would not be a sufficient condition for membership. As Michael Oakeshott has said of 
the medieval universitas: “since association was in terms of a common substantive purpose, membership 
entailed a choice to be associated in pursuit of this purpose” (1975: 204). This would have implied a 
commitment to the collaborative activity required for this pursuit.    
at any given time. But how are members to be identified with the same corporation as 
individuals come and go? What would make a fluctuating membership a stable entity over time 
– that is, a ‘plurality in succession’ (Kantorowicz 1957: 310)? We argue it is the joint pursuit 
of a common activity, or ‘common good’, which gives continuity of identity to successive 
members. We proceed, in the final section, to examine the concept of the ‘common good’ and 
its implications for membership in the modern business corporation.   
 
IV. CORPORATE MEMBERSHIP AND THE COMMON GOOD 
The concept of the ‘common good’ assumes an idea of ‘the good’ which is held in common. 
The concept has taken a particular shape in the business ethics literature on the ‘common good 
of the firm’ (e.g., Argandoña 1998, Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013), based primarily on 
Aristotelian virtue ethics. First, we examine the arguments offered from this tradition. We then 
show that the ‘common good of the firm’ need not imply a substantive concept of ‘the good’ 
to which all members of the firm are committed. Arguments that employ functionally similar 
concepts, but without the teleology of Aristotle’s ethics, can be found in the institutional 
economics literature on the concept of the firm as an entity (Vanberg 1992, Gindis 2009, 
Adelstein 2010). In both approaches, the common good can be conceived as the collaborative 
activity that is specific to a given firm.           
 
In the Aristotelian tradition, to understand what something is, we have to inquire into its reason 
for being or ‘final cause’. For human beings, the final cause is ‘the good’. This is because the 
final cause not only satisfies a person’s inclinations, but also perfects the person, in her essence, 
not in any accidental or partial way. This final cause is called ‘common’ when it can be 
achieved only on the condition that all the individual members of a group achieve it in a non-
excludable and non-rivalrous manner (Sison and Fontrodona 2012: 215). Following Aristotle, 
flourishing (eudaimonia) is posited as the common good of the political community, and 
children as a common good of spouses in families. Within each group, the common good is 
what individuals by nature desire and what perfects them in their particular role, as citizens or 
as spouses and parents.  
 
What, then, is the common good of the business corporation? In the Aristotelian tradition, the 
common good of the firm17 is defined as collaborative or participatory production (Argandoña 
1998, Sison and Fontrodona 2012, 2013). It refers primarily to activities that cannot be carried 
out individually due to technical and time constraints and, instead, require an organized group 
of people (Sison and Fontrodona 2013: 612); it therefore involves what economists refer to as 
a ‘team production’ situation (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). For example, although a ship can 
be moved by an adequate team of sailors, that does not mean that each individual sailor alone 
can move the ship a proportionate distance. Implied in this example is that the members 
cooperate to achieve a goal for the group as a whole (i.e., moving the ship). In Albert the Great’s 
(1206-1280) illustration, the common good of an army comprises not so much the individual 
powers of soldiers in provisioning or fighting, as those individual capacities united in one and 
the same goal – that of securing victory (Kempshall 1999: 31). Although the soldiers may join 
an army to further their own interests, the common good is the victory of the army per se, 
which might only coincide with the goods of the individual soldiers per accidens.  
 
To speak of the group per se is not to assume a reified entity that pursues ‘organisational goals’ 
(Vanberg 1992) independent of its members’ judgements. As Albert the Great comments, in a 
                                                          
17 ‘Firm’ and ‘corporation’ are distinct concepts (Robé 2011). However, what distinguishes an incorporated firm 
(i.e. a business corporation) from any other type of corporation is the defining activity of firms: i.e., the 
collaborative production and sale of goods and services for a profit (Adelstein 2010: 329). To defend our 
concept of corporate membership as participation in, and responsibility for, the collaborative activity of a group, 
it is logical that the characteristic activity of firms (and the literature that expounds the nature of that activity) 
should inform our notion of membership in business corporations.      
definite period of time, the common good may be understood as the total aggregate of 
individual goods, and projected indefinitely toward the future, the common good comprehends 
the unending sequence of individual goods (Kempshall 1999: 30). That is, the collaborative 
activity representing the common good may persist through time with a potentially unending 
stream of different actors. An abstract purpose can therefore be attributed to a ‘plurality in 
succession’ that persists through changes in individual membership. The members of the 
business corporation or firm, therefore, are all those who participate in the collaborative 
productive activity that defines its specific purpose or good.  
 
Institutional theorists of the firm have employed concepts with a similar function. For example, 
Adelstein (2010: 329) describes the firm as an ‘association of individuals’ bound by a 
multilateral ‘relational contract’. This contract is a long-term commitment where “the 
circumstances under which it will have to take place cannot be anticipated” and parties agree 
“instead to procedures for taking decisions and resolving disputes as they arise without 
terminating the relationship itself” (2010: 335). The firm is a “‘going concern’ that all sides 
have an interest in preserving beyond the single transaction at hand” (ibid.). Adelstein adds that 
“the activity of the firm manifests the terms of the agreement among its participants” (2010: 
336). Membership of the ‘relational contract’ would therefore entail participation in the 
collaborative activity of the firm. While medieval jurisprudence conceived of the universitas 
as a ‘fictive’ legal person, the notion of a ‘relational contract’ points to the real collaborative 
activity of the succession of individuals who constitute the corporation. And if this activity 
persists beyond the transactions of individual members, then the universitas (or corporation) 
functions as the legal representation of this ‘going concern’: it enables a plurality to enter 
durable agreements as a single legal entity (Gindis 2009: 39).  
 
Does the existence of a ‘relational contract’ imply a common purpose? The firm has been 
described as a ‘truce’ or ‘treaty’ that mediates “divergent individual interests” (ibid: 340). On 
the other hand, individuals can serve several ‘interests’ through their participation in a firm’s 
activity, one of which can be assumed to include the preservation of the firm as a ‘going 
concern’. Indeed, one of the roles of the entrepreneur is to gain “the willing cooperation of 
owners, managers, and workers with the governing objectives of the enterprise” (ibid: 339). A 
shared understanding of these objectives can, of course, be renegotiated through the relational 
contract, as Gibbons and Henderson (2012: 1359) illustrate with the example of ‘subjective 
bonuses’. And as we argued in section 3.4, medieval corporations owed their legitimacy to 
their members’ pursuit of an ongoing collaborative activity – the corporation’s common good 
– even where the interests of their individual members diverge.  
 
Moreover, it has been argued that the persistence of the firm as a ‘unified body’ presupposes a 
common purpose: “unity is produced by common purpose, concerted action and organization” 
(Gindis 2009: 36). Gindis contends that the ‘motivational glue’ that ensures “adherence to 
common goals” is a characteristic of the firm that “unifies the collective action of its members 
through time” (ibid: 40). Furthermore, the firm’s persistence allows for the replication of the 
routines, tacit knowledge and capabilities that emerge through the relational contract (Gindis 
2009: 39, Adelstein 2010: 333), which implies that membership involves more than mere 
adherence to a common purpose. The collaborative activity in which members participate is 
made possible by the collective knowledge, routines and capabilities the firm develops. That 
these are irreducible to individual capacities enables us to say that the firm remains the same 
entity through changes of membership (Gindis 2009: 39, Adelstein 2010: 333). As we showed 
in section 3.2, the universitas appears in medieval thought as an ‘abstract’ and ‘immaterial’ 
entity, and Adelstein (2010: 337) describes the firm in similar terms as “an idea, a mental 
construction, not a tangible object…” However, these theorists’ emphasis on firm-specific 
capabilities and routines points again to the perpetual activity, or common good, that underpins 
an incorporated firm through time. It brings substance to the idea of the corporation as a 
‘personified community’ with a perpetual life. 
 
An indispensable element of the ‘relational contract’ is a constitution which, according to 
Vanberg’s classic account, defines “the rules and constraints for an ongoing common 
enterprise” (Vanberg 1992: 235). The firm’s constitution enables decision-making for 
“organized or corporate action” (ibid.), and is therefore a precondition for the collaborative 
activity in which members participate. Gindis (2009: 39) observes that the constitution “allows 
the replication of behavioural patterns and collective routines”, which underpins the firm’s 
“economic and legal persistence through time”. Similarly, for Adelstein (2010: 336), the 
relational contract “codifies the consensual relationships and obligations of the firm’s 
participants”, and it is from the performance of that contract that behavioural routines and 
capabilities emerge. He concludes that complex routines enable “collective intentionality and 
emergent, coordinated performance” (2010: 340), and that firms are autonomous entities 
“existing apart from their temporal participants” (2010: 333). These theories explain why it is 
not merely the legal capacity of the corporation, but also the underlying collaborative activity 
(the relational contract with its emergent routines and capabilities) that has an indeterminate 
lifespan. They explain the organisational cohesion and durability implicit in the medieval 
intuition that the universitas is not simply an autonomous legal entity: it is also a plurality of 
individuals succeeding one another in perpetual union.        
 
It is worth noting that Vanberg’s constitutional theory leads him to a different definition of 
membership to the one we have defended. He argues that the ‘essence’ of membership “is to 
give up separate control over certain of one’s resources, and to submit them to an organizational 
decision-making procedure” (1992: 240). He explicitly denies that firms necessarily have 
‘organisational goals’: beyond submission to the firm’s procedures, “the question of whether 
all members of an organization have certain interests or goals in common is viewed as a purely 
factual matter” (ibid: 242). According to Vanberg, membership cannot be defined with 
reference to a corporate ‘common good’: to do so would be to mistake “an empirical issue” for 
a “definitional attribute of organizations” (ibid.).    
 
However, Vanberg perceives of an ‘organizational goal’ as “a notion that can make sense only 
in an organic, collectivistic framework” (ibid: 227). Our concept of a ‘common purpose’ is 
nevertheless compatible with Vanberg’s individualist perspective. Of the many reasons that 
individuals may have for transacting with a firm (or corporation), we have argued that 
participation in, and shared responsibility for, a distinct collaborative activity (or ‘going 
concern’) constitutes membership. And this is to imply a common purpose, or shared 
commitment, among the members to advance that activity.18 When an individual submits 
resources to a firm’s procedural rules, she also submits to the managerial control of those 
resources (Oakeshott, 1975: 115). If managers receive authority from the members, then the 
constitution constrains them to act in the pursuit of purposes that have the members’ approval. 
The constitution does not govern the members and their relationship with management in all 
things (as in a Hobbesian state, in which the alternative is death), but only within the limits of 
their shared objectives. The drawing of those limits depends on the common purpose for which 
the members choose to pool their resources.19  
   
                                                          
18 For an individual member, the extent of this commitment would “depend on such contingent circumstances 
as… the time horizon of his expected future involvement in the organization” (Vanberg 1992: 242).      
19 A common purpose and a constitution are therefore both necessary conditions for defining a firm (or business 
corporation): neither is by itself sufficient. 
In accordance with the conceptual framework developed in section 3.3, the directors of a 
corporation (or incorporated firm) receive their authority in part from the members that elect 
them. Within the freedom granted by ‘superior’ authorities who bestow the privileges of the 
corporate form, directors act legitimately when they serve the members’ interests. What we can 
now argue is that those who ought to be considered members, who do in fact authorise 
management to act on their behalf, are those who choose20 to associate in pursuit of the 
corporation’s common good, which for most ‘active’ members would involve participation in 
and responsibility for the collaborative activity of the firm.  
 
This is not to imply that the roles of participant, beneficiary and decision-maker necessarily 
coincide.21 Some members may be ‘passive’ beneficiaries, who cannot physically participate. 
It is arguable that for members capable of playing an active role, channels should be kept open 
for their participation in decision-making. However, we make no specific claims about the 
particular distribution of authority members should agree to. As Vanberg (1992: 240) puts it, 
since a “great variety of potential solutions to the collective decision problem and the 
distributional problem are conceivable”, one should expect to find a great diversity of 
organisational constitutions. Our claim is merely that when directors act for the corporation (or 
firm), they do so with authority from the members and are therefore obliged to serve their 
common interests.     
       
From the participation of shareholders and other stakeholders in a firm’s common good, certain 
implications follow for their membership status. Shareholders participate by investing the 
financial capital with which “the firm is able to hire workers and acquire the material resources 
                                                          
20 The choice may be made by another acting on their behalf (see footnote 5).  
21 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
necessary to carry out production” (Sison and Fontrodona 2013: 618). The shareholders’ 
investment, in other words, “renders possible the work of the other members of the firm” 
(ibid.).22 Regarding employees, Sison and Fontrodona (2013: 622-623) point to a range of 
“organisational citizenship behaviours” (e.g., altruism, sportsmanship, courtesy and 
conscientiousness) that go beyond the employment contract. Through these behaviours, 
“worker participation in the corporate common good is enhanced not only objectively, in terms 
of improved corporate performance, but also subjectively, that is, through opportunities to 
develop individual virtues” (2013: 623). From this Aristotelian perspective, employee loyalty 
“is not so much the result of locking-in assets as a mutual concern for each other’s flourishing 
and well-being” (2013: 622).      
 
Whether suppliers and consumers can claim membership status, and under what circumstances, 
is less clear. There are various means by which these stakeholders participate in the common 
good of the firm. Consumers can understand themselves as active participants in their 
relationship with the firm (Sison and Fontrodona 2013: 619). For example, clients can engage 
in co-production to influence “the design or delivery of products to better suit their particular 
needs, enhancing satisfaction and strengthening loyalty to that specific corporate community” 
(ibid.). Suppliers could participate in the common good by establishing an ethical supply chain 
initiative that diminishes exploitative labour practices and harmful working conditions (e.g. in 
sweatshops) (2013: 620).  
 
                                                          
22 It can be objected that shareholders do not generally invest capital directly in corporations (Sikka and Stittle 
2017: 5). However, for many shareholders who do purchase directly from companies, the possibility to sell their 
shares is presumably part of their incentive to invest. It follows that shareholders who purchase shares in the 
equities markets are not, ipso facto, excluded from the common good of the firms in which they hold shares - 
they participate via the stock market.       
However, these cases illustrate the significance of Oakeshott’s (1975) criterion that 
membership entails a choice to associate and therefore a shared responsibility for the work the 
members do together. The participation of consumers and suppliers in the activity of a 
corporation does not necessarily imply they have become part of the association, unless there 
is a formal agreement to associate (e.g. by purchasing shares in a firm) or a sharing of 
responsibility for the common purpose over time (e.g. through a long-term contribution to the 
corporation’s aims).23 Equally, one might ask whether shareholders and employees with only 
a temporary attachment to the corporation should be considered members. Mayer (2013: 265), 
for example, argues that voting control (and by implication, membership) should be held only 
by shareholders who commit to their investments for a specified duration.  
   
V. CONCLUSION 
We began by asking why any particular group or individual should have membership status in 
a corporation. To ask this question is implicitly to challenge the legal norm that shareholders 
alone have membership status in the business corporation. However, we found that critiques of 
shareholder primacy, especially in the legal literature, do not typically question this 
assumption. To examine the issue, we turned to theories of the corporate form which, though 
developed in a different historical context, show how concepts relevant to the present debate 
(authority, ownership and participation) can apply to the corporation. By engaging with 
arguments from the medieval period, we extrapolated an understanding of the relationship 
between a corporation and its members, which in turn enabled fresh insights into the 
membership claims of different stakeholders in the modern corporation. 
 
                                                          
23 For this reason, for example, a university might grant the rights of membership to its emeritus professors and 
honorary staff, but not to its visiting speakers.     
In summary, the medieval corporation, like its modern counterpart, was a legal ‘person’ with 
assets and liabilities separate from those of its individual members. Without inconsistency, the 
corporation could also be seen as the representation of its members as a collective entity. Its 
members, then, were collective ‘owners’ of the corporation’s assets, in much the way described 
in the late nineteenth century by Freund (1897: 34): “The law does not connect the [property] 
right with A or B or C absolutely or unqualifiedly, but only in so far as they remain… within 
the nexus of a certain association.” Typically, the corporation’s governing body was authorised 
in part by election of the members, and in part through the approval of a ‘higher’ authority 
which confirmed the members’ right to act as a corporation.  
 
However, we found this framework left unexplained the nature of the activity that members 
could participate in together to define their corporate identity over time. To complete the 
argument, in section 4 we explored the idea of the ‘common good’ of the firm. We found that 
to think of firms as relational contracts, with constitutive structures that allow for the 
emergence of capabilities and replication of behavioural routines, can explain the persistence 
of the collaborative activity that defines a corporation. We argued that this activity is captured 
in the concept, prevalent in Aristotelian business ethics, of the ‘common good’ of a group. We 
then considered how different stakeholders can participate in the firm’s common good and hold 
the status of members, where membership is defined by this participation. If members are 
‘collective owners’ who jointly authorise management to serve their interests, it follows that 
the role of management is to pursue the common purpose made possible by the collaborative 
activity in which various stakeholders (not only shareholders) may participate and share 
responsibility. 
 
Future research might consider how the legal concept of the company (or members) “as a 
whole” could reflect the interests of all who share responsibility for the company’s common 
good, thus leading to an expanded concept of membership. For example, in the context of the 
UK Companies Act, Deeming et al. (2016) have argued that employees who meet a certain 
threshold (in length of service and hours of work) should have statutory recognition as 
members of the company and the right to block takeovers recommended by the board. The 
concept of the corporation as a succession of members committed to a common good supports 
the preference for ‘committed shareholders’ (Mayer 2013: 206) and a long-term perspective in 
equity markets (Kay 2012). There is also potential to extend the critique of the primacy of 
short-term shareholder value. Stout (2015: 696) has recently argued that because of its 
perpetuity and ‘asset lock-in’, the corporation is potentially a ‘time machine’ for long-term 
investments that benefit future generations.  
 
Finally, if the membership status of shareholders is defined by their responsibility for the 
corporation’s common good, they can be argued to have a duty to exercise their moral 
judgement, and voting power, with respect to the consequences of decisions taken in their name 
(Monks et al. 2004, Mansell 2013). The moral arguments for these corporate governance 
reforms can be strengthened through a better understanding of membership and the source of 
corporate authority. We have argued these problems are connected. The medieval analysis of 
ownership, authority, participation and the common good supports a clearer account of the 
relationship between a corporation and its members, and of what it means for managers to 
exercise authority in the corporation’s name. 
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